Totally Fine Foundation · Issue 006 · Proxy War / Too Many Tables

Eastern DR Congo / M23 War

Last reviewed · Totally Fine Foundation editorial desk · 11 min

In its fifth year the M23 war is measured in ledgers that must never be added — displaced kept apart from returned, refugees apart from the hungry, a civilian toll apart from a military one. Two things the independent record does state, each in careful wording: the UN names Rwanda's forces behind M23, and a UN mission finds all sides did harm.

Metrics

The war with too many peace tables.

A war costed at a billion four, and cut

OCHA writes the M23 war down as an accounting problem. Its 2026 plan counts 14.9 million people in humanitarian need, asks US$1.4 billion to answer it, and admits it can fund a response for only 7.3 million — down from the 11 million it prioritised the year before. The cut did not follow any easing on the ground: OCHA is explicit that the need fell from 21.2 million to 14.9 million on a change of method, not improvement, and that the narrowed target is a funding decision, not a smaller crisis.

By late June the appeal sat about 53 per cent covered, a US$655.8 million gap still open — a live figure that moves as contributions arrive. Underneath the arithmetic runs the friction its field reports record: convoys held up at gunpoint, a needs-assessment team taking ten hours to cover 22 kilometres of mud, and access OCHA calls more dangerous and more complex than ever. The measurements are authoritative, but they are also appeals — OCHA reports needs and its own access, and names no belligerent's guilt.

Sources: UN OCHA — Democratic Republic of the Congo — 2026 appeal and situation reports

Four ways to count the uprooted

The people the war moved are counted in registers that must never be summed. UNHCR keeps two of them deliberately apart: 1,247,610 Congolese registered as refugees and asylum-seekers across the region as of 30 April 2026 — more than half in Uganda — against 5,773,180 displaced inside the country, dated 31 March. IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix draws the internal map larger still: 5,647,465 displaced across the four eastern provinces, with armed-group attacks the cause 87 per cent of host-family IDPs cite.

A separate column, never subtracted from the first, tracks return: OCHA logs 2.32 million returnees in North Kivu alongside that province's displaced. Return is not resolution — IOM notes many go back to destroyed or occupied homes and face re-displacement. Every one of these numbers sits on a live dashboard, leans partly on host-government registration, and carries its own as-of date; combining them into one dramatic total would misrepresent the data.

The May 2026 assessment reported more than 9,000 displaced people in Kamango, North Kivu, as of May 2026. The assessment described the zone as moving toward hotspot status because needs were increasing while significant response gaps persisted.

MSF reported in its 21 Oct 2026 report that approximately 35,000 people remained in Busuma, Burundi, and that living conditions there remained extremely precarious. WFP reported on 24 Jul 2026 that more than 130,000 refugees were in Burundi, most of them fleeing conflict in the DRC.

WFP warned on 24 Jul 2026 that food assistance for more than 130,000 refugees in Burundi risked ending without urgent funding. MSF reported in its 21 Oct 2026 report that food and cash distributions in Busuma had been repeatedly scaled back because of insufficient funding and that shelters built at the beginning of the Busuma crisis had a lifespan of only six months. MSF also reported in that report that more than 20,000 refugees had returned from Burundi to the DRC under a United Nations-run voluntary return programme.

Sources: UNHCR — DR Congo emergency — refugees, asylum-seekers and internal displacement; IOM — DRC Crisis Response Plan and Displacement Tracking Matrix (with IPC food security); UN OCHA — Democratic Republic of the Congo — 2026 appeal and situation reports

The proxy, named — in the words the UN chose

The attribution most readers reach for is left to the bodies entitled to make it, and reported in their exact wording. The UN Group of Experts found that Rwanda held de facto control and direction over M23 operations, with every M23 unit supervised and supported by RDF special forces, and 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandan troops in North Kivu in its late-2024 report. Its December 2025 midterm estimated 6,000 to 7,000; a newer report revises the current estimate sharply upward, to between 14,000 and 18,000 Rwandan soldiers across the two Kivus as of late December 2025.

The Group's legal finding is stated conditionally and is its own assessment, not a court's: RDF's de facto direction and effective control render Rwanda liable for the actions of AFC/M23, and Rwanda's direct use of armed force against the DRC may constitute an act of aggression. The Security Council echoed the frame, citing the M23 offensive quotation omitted from the machine-readable edition. Rwanda denies all of it, casting any presence as self-defence against the FDLR. The dossier records the findings at the wording their authors chose — decisive support and de facto control, not a flat 'Rwandan army,' and not its own verdict.

Sources: United Nations Security Council — UN Group of Experts on the DRC — midterm report; UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) — MONUSCO — mandate, civilian protection and a paused drawdown

All parties, one ledger

The atrocity record refuses the single villain, and the source that most refuses it is the UN's own. Between January and July 2025 the Human Rights Office Fact-Finding Mission found quotation omitted from the machine-readable edition — murder, torture, rape and sexual slavery — and that M23 may have committed crimes against humanity. It logged at least 319 civilians killed by M23 in Rutshuru over thirteen days in July. In the same report, at the same standard, it found the Congolese army and its allied Wazalendo militias committed war crimes of their own, and that certain Wazalendo conscripted or enlisted children under 15.

On sexual violence the mission kept its streams separate — over 1,000 victims logged in South Kivu, attributed to retreating government-aligned forces. On Rwanda it stayed clinical, finding it responsible for violations directly committed by its armed forces, with credible allegations of covert RDF presence within M23. These are findings at the 'reasonable grounds to believe' threshold — allegations warranting a Commission of Inquiry, not adjudicated guilt — and they name the state's own soldiers alongside the rebels. Both axes are on the page. Neither is the whole page.

Sources: OHCHR / UN Human Rights — Fact-Finding Mission on North and South Kivu (A/HRC/60/80); Human Rights Watch — Eastern DRC abuse documentation — Uvira, the camps, and the other axis

How the peace tables multiplied

The diplomacy has fragmented faster than the front lines, and the offensives kept taking ground as the ink dried. The DRC and Rwanda signed a US- and Qatar-mediated agreement in Washington on 27 June 2025, the presidents following on 4 December; M23, not a party to it, signed a separate Doha declaration with Kinshasa on 19 July. Neither track stopped the war. ACLED reads the same period as a march of falling cities — Goma besieged in January, Bukavu in February, Uvira in December — each attributed to a Rwanda-backed M23, and its first quarter alone recorded over 2,500 reported fatalities, the deadliest quarter since 2002.

MONUSCO, meanwhile, sits on the clock: the Security Council renewed its mandate to December 2026 at an authorised ceiling of 11,500 troops, then paused the mission's own withdrawal. The regional forces sent to contain M23 are judged by analysts to have failed; the SADC mission began withdrawing after Goma fell and fourteen of its South African peacekeepers were killed. Where minerals appear, they appear as the sources frame them — a documented economic stake and an accelerant, not a proven sole cause. This dossier issues no ruling on blame; what it can state is attributed to whoever established it.

Sources: ACLED — DRC / M23 — political-violence event data; UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) — MONUSCO — mandate, civilian protection and a paused drawdown; International Crisis Group — The M23 Offensive: Elusive Peace in the Great Lakes (Africa Report N°320)

Humanitarian access and response gaps

The May 2026 assessment described worsening humanitarian access constraints in Lulingu, South Kivu, with the area moving toward hotspot status amid high levels of need and gaps in lifesaving response. In Ituri, the assessment described Lolwa and Mongbalu as being in a critical situation and moving toward hotspot status, and as affected by gaps in lifesaving and frontline response.

Reports describe the protection situation in North Kivu as critical, involving armed clashes, serious human-rights violations, forced displacement and fatalities, including children.

New displacement was reported in Masisi and Walikale, alongside the destruction of a health centre at Malemo by an explosive device.

Reported human-rights abuses in North Kivu included ransom kidnappings, forced labour, reprisals against civilians suspected of collaborating with rival armed groups, and collective rape, including of displaced women in Kalole, Masisi. An explosive-remnants-of-war incident at Nyarubande/Gikoro in Rutshuru reportedly caused deaths and injuries, including among boys herding livestock. Violence reportedly occurred during the dispersal of a protected burial at Rwangoma in Beni in the context of the Ebola response, with several women killed and others injured.

Sources: United Nations Security Council — UN Group of Experts on the DRC — midterm report

Claims and evidence

M23 is an indigenous Congolese protection force acting on its own, not a foreign proxy.

Claimant: M23 / AFC

Evidence status: disputed

Counterclaim: The UN Group of Experts found Rwanda exercised de facto control and direction over M23, every unit supervised and supported by RDF special forces.

Independent assessment: Disputed: local grievances are real and predate the movement, but the evidence of decisive external control contradicts the 'independent indigenous force' claim. Use the exact expert wording; do not overstate into a flat 'Rwandan army.'

Sources: United Nations Security Council — UN Group of Experts on the DRC — midterm report

FARDC and its allied forces only defend civilians; abuses are the rebels' doing.

Claimant: DRC government / FARDC

Evidence status: disputed

Counterclaim: The UN Fact-Finding Mission concluded all parties committed serious violations possibly amounting to war crimes.

Independent assessment: Disputed: the mission documented rape, murder of civilians and looting by government-affiliated forces, systematic sexual violence during the early-2025 retreat, and Wazalendo recruitment of children under 15. Culpability is shared, though this does not equate the parties' overall conduct.

Sources: OHCHR / UN Human Rights — Fact-Finding Mission on North and South Kivu (A/HRC/60/80)

The eastern DRC crisis is primarily a mineral war.

Claimant: Common single-cause framing

Evidence status: likely

Counterclaim: Minerals are a documented factor — coltan smuggled monthly to Rwanda, M23 taxing the trade — but analysts caution resource control is one factor among many.

Independent assessment: Likely partial: the Group documents AFC/M23 control of nearly half of South Kivu's cassiterite and coltan and over two-thirds of its wolframite, a real economic stake. But citizenship, ethnicity, land, Rwandan security concerns and state weakness all bear on it — a factor and accelerant, not a proven sole cause.

Sources: United Nations Security Council — UN Group of Experts on the DRC — midterm report; International Crisis Group — The M23 Offensive: Elusive Peace in the Great Lakes (Africa Report N°320)

M23 deliberately executed civilians in Goma in February 2025, amounting to war crimes.

Claimant: Human Rights Watch

Evidence status: confirmed

Counterclaim: M23 disputes deliberate targeting of civilians.

Independent assessment: Confirmed at the documented scale: HRW documented at least 21 civilians and most likely many more summarily executed on 22–23 February 2025 (13 identities verified with head or chest gunshot wounds), concluding the wounds and absence of fighting indicate deliberate execution — described as war crimes, with Rwanda possibly complicit. Broader offensive totals are separate from these documented executions.

Sources: Human Rights Watch — Eastern DRC abuse documentation — Uvira, the camps, and the other axis

Timeline

  1. — M23 resumes offensive; captures Kiwanja and Rutshuru

    M23 rebels relaunched military operations in North Kivu, capturing key towns and advancing on Goma. The UN Group of Experts found evidence of Rwandan military support for M23.

    Sources: ACLED — DRC — ACLED Event Tracker

  2. — M23 captures Goma, largest city in eastern DRC

    M23 forces captured Goma, the largest city in eastern DRC and a major humanitarian hub, after DRC army and SADC peacekeeping forces withdrew. The fall of Goma marked a major escalation of the conflict and triggered mass displacement.

    Sources: UNOCHA — DRC Humanitarian Situation — UNOCHA; ACLED — DRC — ACLED Event Tracker

  3. — SADC withdrawal continues; fresh displacement in South Kivu

    SADC peacekeeping forces continue their withdrawal from Goma under M23 pressure. OCHA reported new displacement of approximately 200,000 people south of Bukavu following renewed fighting.

    Sources: UNOCHA — DRC Humanitarian Situation — UNOCHA; ReliefWeb — DRC Crisis — ReliefWeb

  4. — Kamango reported over 9,000 displaced and described as moving toward hotspot status

    The May 2026 assessment reported more than 9,000 displaced people in Kamango, North Kivu, as of May 2026, and described the zone as moving toward hotspot status because needs were increasing while significant response gaps persisted.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-08)

  5. — Lulingu access constraints described as worsening, zone moving toward hotspot

    The May 2026 assessment described worsening humanitarian access constraints in Lulingu, South Kivu, with the area moving toward hotspot status amid high needs and gaps in lifesaving response.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-08)

  6. — Lolwa and Mongbalu in Ituri described as critical and moving toward hotspot

    The May 2026 assessment described Lolwa and Mongbalu in Ituri as being in a critical situation and moving toward hotspot status, and as affected by gaps in lifesaving and frontline response.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-08)

  7. — WFP reports more than 130,000 refugees in Burundi and warns food assistance risks ending without urgent funding

    WFP reported on 24 Jul 2026 that more than 130,000 refugees were in Burundi, most fleeing conflict in the DRC, and warned that food assistance risked ending without urgent funding.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-10)

  8. — MSF reports precarious conditions, reduced food and cash distributions, and short-lived shelters in Busuma

    MSF reported in its 21 Oct 2026 report that living conditions remained extremely precarious for Congolese refugees in Busuma, food and cash distributions had been repeatedly scaled back because of insufficient funding, and shelters built at the start of the crisis had a lifespan of only six months.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-10)

  9. — MSF reports more than 20,000 refugees returned from Burundi to DRC under UN-run voluntary return programme

    MSF reported in its 21 Oct 2026 report that more than 20,000 refugees had returned from Burundi to the Democratic Republic of the Congo under a United Nations-run voluntary return programme.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-10)

Open questions

  • How many Rwandan Defence Force troops are deployed in eastern DRC? The UN Group of Experts estimates 14,000–18,000 as of late December 2025, up from 6,000–7,000 in its midterm report; Rwanda rejects the estimate.
  • Is M23 acting on its own, as it says, or as a foreign proxy?
  • Are FARDC and its allied forces only defending civilians, as the government says, or are they also responsible for abuses?
  • Is the war in eastern DRC driven mainly by minerals, as a common framing has it, or are minerals one factor among several?

Source registry

  1. United Nations Security Council — UN Group of Experts on the DRC — midterm report; primary_document; 2025-12-30
  2. OHCHR / UN Human Rights — Fact-Finding Mission on North and South Kivu (A/HRC/60/80); human_rights; 2025-09-05
  3. UN OCHA — Democratic Republic of the Congo — 2026 appeal and situation reports; humanitarian; 2026-01-28
  4. IOM — DRC Crisis Response Plan and Displacement Tracking Matrix (with IPC food security); humanitarian; 2026-02-01
  5. UNHCR — DR Congo emergency — refugees, asylum-seekers and internal displacement; humanitarian; 2026-04-30
  6. ACLED — DRC / M23 — political-violence event data; research; 2025-06-18
  7. Human Rights Watch — Eastern DRC abuse documentation — Uvira, the camps, and the other axis; human_rights; 2026-06-10
  8. UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) — MONUSCO — mandate, civilian protection and a paused drawdown; official_position; 2025-12-19
  9. International Crisis Group — The M23 Offensive: Elusive Peace in the Great Lakes (Africa Report N°320); research; 2025-12-19

Plain-text edition · All dossiers