Totally Fine Foundation · Issue 010 · Two Ledgers / Collapse

Haiti Gang Crisis

Last reviewed · Totally Fine Foundation editorial desk · 11 min

Over half the country is written into a humanitarian plan, a million and a half are driven from home, and the quarter's dead are counted by the thousand — but the most disciplined reading of who did the killing does not point where the reflex expects. Over all of it sits a state with no elected officials and a foreign force whose mandate is vast and whose effect is unproven.

Metrics

The country that keeps two ledgers.

Half a country, written into a plan

OCHA reads Haiti in 2026 as a standing emergency. Its plan counts 6.4 million people — over half the population — in need of assistance, up from 6 million the year before. Against that, the plan asks US$880 million to reach 4.2 million of them, and by April it had received less than a fifth of the money. The gap between the 6.4 million assessed as in need and the 4.2 million the plan can afford to target is not a smaller crisis; it is a funding-and-access limit, and OCHA keeps the two numbers apart.

Underneath the ledger sit the drivers, each its own distinct count: 1.4 million already displaced by armed groups at the launch, 5.7 million short of food every day, 27 women and girls assaulted daily, 1,600 schools shut and roughly 250,000 children out of education. These are planning figures from a body that is also appealing for funds — authoritative for the humanitarian sector, and attributed as such.

OCHA's Haiti situation report (data as of 30 September 2026) records that about 335,000 people in Artibonite department lack adequate access to health care, and that insecurity has forced the closure of 21 health facilities there.

According to OCHA, humanitarian partners reported reaching 70% of the national target of 4.2 million people as of 30 September 2026. Coverage remained uneven across departments, and reported reach did not mean that needs were fully covered.

According to OCHA, in Nord-Est and Grand'Anse the number of people reached exceeded initial targets partly because those targets were narrow; this did not indicate complete coverage of needs. OCHA also reported that Nord-Ouest and Sud-Est had the lowest response rates—18% and 31% respectively—because those departments were less prioritized in activities, and that humanitarian access remained a major limiting factor, contributing to Artibonite's 54% response rate. According to OCHA, declared funding for the 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan reached $435 million, approximately 49% of the $880 million required, as of 30 September 2026; the reported funding level limited the capacity to maintain and strengthen priority interventions amid deteriorating operating conditions.

Sources: UN OCHA — Haiti 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan

The map of the displaced keeps moving

The engine of the humanitarian crisis is displacement, and IOM counts it as a running tally that goes stale between rounds. Its Displacement Tracking Matrix put Haiti's internally displaced at nearly 1.5 million by June 2026 — a record, enumerated at 1,450,254 in the December cycle and up from about 1.3 million a year earlier. In May, renewed attacks on Cité Soleil displaced more than 18,000 people within days, pushing Port-au-Prince above 300,000 internally displaced for the first time on record.

The pressure is spreading: armed attacks in the South-East Department, once a refuge for people fleeing elsewhere, displaced more than 5,000. A separate category sits alongside and must not be added to it — more than 110,000 Haitians forcibly returned to the country since the start of 2026, many arriving with nothing into areas already unsafe.

According to OCHA's Haiti situation report (data as of 30 September 2026), the latest count puts the number of displaced people in Haiti at 1.49 million, up from 1.47 million in an earlier count. The report also notes that displacement is spreading beyond Port-au-Prince to rural areas and provincial towns.

Sources: IOM — Haiti internal displacement (IOM / DTM); UN OCHA — Haiti 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan

The quarter, and where the bodies came from

BINUH, the UN's office in Haiti, turns three months into an accountability ledger, and its central finding inverts the reflex. In the first quarter of 2026, it recorded at least 1,642 people killed and 745 injured — kept as separate categories. The unsettling part is the attribution. BINUH puts more than 69 per cent of those killed or injured on operations carried out by security forces against gangs, sometimes supported by a private military company using drones; 27 per cent on the gangs themselves; and 4 per cent on self-defence groups. These are responsibility shares of the same casualty pool, and they describe the anti-gang campaign generating large civilian harm rather than the gangs acting alone.

Of the victims of drone strikes, BINUH counts 69 who were members of the population, five of them children; a further 33 people it attributes to executions or attempted summary executions involving police. The gangs' own toll is recorded distinctly: sexual violence against more than 292 victims, mainly women and girls aged 12 to 17, used as a means of collective punishment in the areas they hold. That figure is a documented floor — sexual violence is systematically under-reported — and no survivor is named.

Sources: BINUH / OHCHR — More than 1,600 killed in the first quarter of 2026

Three sets of hands, and a wider window

Human Rights Watch refuses to let one number stand for Haiti, and disaggregates the toll by who caused it. Citing OHCHR, it records criminal groups as having killed at least 4,384 people between January and September 2025, injured 1,899 and kidnapped 491. Against that it sets the state's own toll for an overlapping period: at least 3,199 killed during police operations between January and August, 17 per cent of them not involved in the clashes, and at least 1,243 more killed in 141 drone strikes between March 2025 and January 2026 that it ties to a prime-ministerial task force and the private firm Vectus Global. These are separate lines with different sources and windows, and must not be added to the gang figure.

The abuse reaches the intervention itself: a UN report found the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support mission responsible for four cases of sexual violence, including the rape of a 12-year-old girl and two 16-year-olds. Kenya calls the allegations unsubstantiated; the UN says only one of the four cases was internally investigated. HRW is an advocate relaying UN primaries, so its totals are attributed and corroborated, not treated as independent counts.

The same OCHA Haiti situation report (data as of 30 September 2026) projects that 253,725 children aged 6 to 59 months in Haiti are at risk of acute malnutrition within a projection period ending in 2027. According to the report, the national prevalence of global acute malnutrition rose from 5.1 percent in the 2023 assessment to 7.4 percent in the 2026 assessment. Health partners carried out 74,614 medical consultations through 120 mobile clinic deployments, according to the report.

Sources: Human Rights Watch — Haiti — country reporting and investigations

A mandate is not a restored city

The Security Council retired one force and authorized a much larger one, and the distance between authorization and effect is the story. Resolution 2793, adopted on 30 September 2025, folds the Kenyan-led MSS mission into a Gang Suppression Force with a 12-month mandate, a personnel ceiling of 5,550 and authorization to conduct intelligence-led operations to neutralise gangs. The predecessor collapsed on a fault line the new force inherits: the MSS peaked near 991, ran on voluntary funding that secured only about US$400 million of an estimated US$600 million, and left when its final Kenyan contingent departed on 27 April 2026. Its replacement had, by late April, roughly 400 Chadian troops on the ground, with fully operational projected for October 2026.

The mandate is vast; the arrival is not. On the ground the reordering is what independent monitors record rather than any restoration of control: ACLED ranks Haiti the world's eighth most severe conflict in 2025, up from eleventh, on more than 4,500 killed by political violence in a single index year. And the estimate everyone reaches for, gang control of Port-au-Prince, is put at around 90 per cent by UNODC, by ACLED and by the UN across late 2025 and April 2026 — a figure that varies by source, date and definition, and that this dossier attributes and dates rather than states as fixed.

Sources: UN Security Council — MSS to Gang Suppression Force (Resolution 2793); ACLED — Haiti political-violence data

ICRC reports clashes affecting Port-au-Prince, Artibonite, central region and South-East

According to the ICRC, since mid-April 2026 armed clashes have affected several areas of Port-au-Prince, Artibonite, Haiti's central region and, more recently, the South-East. The ICRC reports that areas previously considered relatively safe are becoming unsafe, leaving people with fewer places to seek shelter.

The ICRC reports that the spread of armed violence is further worsening living conditions for communities that were already severely affected. The ICRC also states that the violence is contributing to repeated displacement, reduced access to health care and the erosion of livelihoods, with consequences disproportionately affecting the most vulnerable people.

The ICRC warns that the prospect of new offensive operations is raising fears of increased humanitarian consequences if necessary precautions are not taken.

According to OCHA's Latin America and the Caribbean weekly situation report as of 6 November 2026, nearly 1.5 million people were displaced across Haiti, and almost 80 percent were outside Port-au-Prince. Most displaced people were staying with host families, according to the same report.

The same OCHA report recorded violence in Couyo, Arcahaie, on 18 October 2026 that displaced 2,884 people, and attacks in Petite-Rivière de l'Artibonite since 19 October 2026 that forced about 13,900 people from their homes.

According to OCHA's 6 November 2026 report, two Norwegian Refugee Council staff members were killed in Port-au-Prince on 27 October 2026.

Sources: BINUH / OHCHR — More than 1,600 killed in the first quarter of 2026

Claims and evidence

The international security support is restoring control in Haiti.

Claimant: State and intervention framing

Evidence status: disputed

Counterclaim: The MSS deployed under-strength and underfunded and gangs expanded during its tenure.

Independent assessment: Disputed: as of June 2026 gangs still hold ~90 per cent of the capital, 2,300+ have been killed in 2026, and the Gang Suppression Force had barely begun operations. The existence of a mandate is not the same as territorial control; the framing is forward-looking.

Sources: UN Security Council — MSS to Gang Suppression Force (Resolution 2793); ACLED — Haiti political-violence data

Haiti's crisis is primarily a policing problem, best solved by an anti-gang force.

Claimant: Security-first framing

Evidence status: disputed

Counterclaim: Analysts argue the crisis is at least equally governance collapse, impunity, illicit arms flows and food/health-system breakdown.

Independent assessment: Disputed: no elected officials since 7 February 2026, health facilities closed, ~5.9M acutely food-insecure, cholera resurgent — none of which a combat force resolves, and BINUH's 69 per cent finding suggests force alone can worsen civilian harm.

Sources: Human Rights Watch — Haiti — country reporting and investigations; UN OCHA — Haiti 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan; BINUH / OHCHR — More than 1,600 killed in the first quarter of 2026

Gangs control a single fixed share (~90%) of Port-au-Prince; the capital is uniformly inaccessible.

Claimant: Common shorthand

Evidence status: disputed

Counterclaim: The estimates vary by source, date and definition and describe a shifting, neighbourhood-by-neighbourhood contest.

Independent assessment: Disputed: UN News cites 'up to 90%' while separately estimating Viv Ansanm at ~70%; ACLED declines percentages and maps violence by neighbourhood; BINUH notes security advances in certain areas of downtown. Any single percentage goes stale fast and conflates 'influence' with 'control.'

Sources: ACLED — Haiti political-violence data; BINUH / OHCHR — More than 1,600 killed in the first quarter of 2026

Timeline

  1. — President Jovenel Moïse assassinated

    Haiti's president Jovenel Moïse was assassinated in his private residence in Port-au-Prince, plunging the country into political turmoil. The violence coincided with a major earthquake in August 2021.

    Sources: International Crisis Group — Haiti Crisis — International Crisis Group

  2. — Gang coalition seizes control of major Port-au-Prince arteries and National Penitentiary

    Gang coalition led by Jimmy 'Barbecue' Chérizier attacked the main port and seized the National Penitentiary, releasing approximately 4,000 inmates. Prime Minister Ariel Henry was stranded abroad and unable to return.

    Sources: UNOCHA — Haiti Humanitarian Situation — UNOCHA; International Crisis Group — Haiti Crisis — International Crisis Group

  3. — 600,000 displaced; MSS mission struggling to restore order

    OCHA reported 600,000 IDPs in Haiti, primarily in Port-au-Prince. The Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support Mission has made limited headway against entrenched gang control, with operations constrained by funding shortfalls.

    Sources: UNOCHA — Haiti Humanitarian Situation — UNOCHA; ReliefWeb — Haiti Crisis — ReliefWeb

  4. — ICRC reports clashes affecting South-East more recently since mid-April 2026

    The ICRC reports that since mid-April 2026 armed clashes have affected several areas of Port-au-Prince, Artibonite, the central region and, more recently, the South-East.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-08)

  5. — Reported attack on Marmont section of Saint-Michel de l'Attalaye

    Members of GCO de Savien, accompanied by Kokorat San Ras, reportedly attacked the 7th communal section of Marmont in the locality of Nan Paul on a market day, according to the 28 July 2026 rapid assessment published on ReliefWeb. The group was reported in the same assessment as 12 heavily armed individuals and reportedly established an illegal toll post, searching people traveling to or returning from the market.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-08)

  6. — Residents reportedly leave Marmont section following reported attack

    Following the attack, residents reportedly left the Marmont section to seek refuge in other communes, according to the 28 July 2026 rapid assessment; no displacement total was provided.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-08)

  7. — Armed violence reported in Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite in IOM's partially confirmed account

    According to the International Organization for Migration's partially confirmed account, armed violence was reported from 19 October 2026 in the municipality of Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite, Haiti; the account states the violence primarily affected the town centre of Bas Coursin 2 and the locality of L'Amour, both in the 2nd communal section.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-10)

  8. — IOM DTM estimate published 23 October 2026 puts displacement at approximately 7,250 during 19–22 October incident period

    According to the International Organization for Migration's Displacement Tracking Matrix estimate published on 23 October 2026, approximately 7,250 people (1,637 households) were displaced between 19 and 22 October 2026; IOM reported that 60% found refuge in Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite and 40% in neighbouring Verrettes, and that 86% stayed with host families while 14% settled in two sites that existed before the incidents.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-10)

  9. — IOM emergency tracking update covers displacement linked to armed violence in Gros Morne, Artibonite

    According to IOM's Emergency Tracking Update 110.2, displacement related to armed violence was tracked in Gros Morne commune, Artibonite, over the period 28 September to 13 October 2026; the provided evidence does not state how many people were displaced or provide casualty figures. Update 110.2 is presented as an attached infographic.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-10)

  10. — IOM emergency tracking update covers displacement following armed violence in Arcahaie, West Department

    A separate IOM Emergency Tracking Update numbered 111 covers displacement following armed violence in Arcahaie, West Department, for 18–21 October 2026, according to IOM.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-10)

  11. — Carlos Ruiz Massieu briefs UN Security Council on Haiti

    Carlos Ruiz Massieu, the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Haiti and Head of BINUH, addressed the UN Security Council on 19 October 2026. In his remarks, he said the UN had learned with deep concern of an attack on Salvadoran members of the Gang Suppression Force, and that Haiti's electoral preparations had reached an unprecedented level in more than a decade, with more than 35 political parties and groupings and more than 3,500 candidates registered; he also said efforts to advance Haiti's political transition continued despite a difficult security context.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-10)

  12. — IPC Haiti acute food insecurity snapshot published on ReliefWeb

    The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) released a new acute food insecurity analysis for Haiti, published on ReliefWeb on 29 October 2026 and cited by WFP on 28 October 2026, reportedly covering September 2026 to June 2027. According to WFP, 6.35 million people in Haiti are projected to face acute food insecurity in the March–June 2027 projection period; the projected March–June 2027 acutely food insecure population is more than half a million higher than the same period in 2026; almost 2 million people are expected to face Emergency levels of hunger (IPC Phase 4); and more than 1.5 million Haitians have been forced from their homes. The crisis is reportedly driven by armed-group violence, economic instability, poor agricultural performance, displacement, and the growing impact of El Niño; acute hunger is reportedly on an upward trajectory and set to reach record levels. WFP states it needs US$78 million to sustain its Haiti operations through March 2027.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-10)

  13. — SRSG consults civil society ahead of Security Council session on Haiti

    According to the BINUH bulletin, Carlos Ruiz Massieu met civil society representatives, including women's and youth organisations, on 7 October 2026 to gather their views on the situation in Haiti ahead of the Security Council session. The bulletin separately reports, without specifying when, that Ruiz Massieu emphasised the essential role of civil society in national efforts to restore security, promote effective governance, fight impunity and create the conditions for credible elections.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-11)

  14. — UN Security Council session on Haiti; SRSG calls for continued support and full Gang Suppression Force deployment

    According to the BINUH bulletin of October 2026, Special Representative and Head of BINUH Carlos Ruiz Massieu, addressing the UN Security Council session on Haiti on 19 October 2026, called for continued support to Haiti, including the full deployment of the Gang Suppression Force, citing increasing violence against communities and stressing a complementary approach combining security, justice, and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-11)

  15. — OCHA reports 1.49 million displaced people in Haiti

    According to OCHA's Haiti situation report (data as of 30 September 2026), the latest count puts the number of displaced people in Haiti at 1.49 million, up from 1.47 million in an earlier count, with displacement spreading beyond Port-au-Prince to rural areas and provincial towns.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-11)

  16. — OCHA records Artibonite health access gaps

    According to OCHA's Haiti situation report (data as of 30 September 2026), about 335,000 people in Artibonite department lack adequate access to health care, and insecurity has forced the closure of 21 health facilities there.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-11)

  17. — OCHA projects acute malnutrition risk for 253,725 children

    According to OCHA's Haiti situation report (data as of 30 September 2026), 253,725 children aged 6 to 59 months in Haiti are projected to be at risk of acute malnutrition within a projection period ending in 2027; the same report states that the national prevalence of global acute malnutrition rose from 5.1 percent in the 2023 assessment to 7.4 percent in the 2026 assessment.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-11)

  18. — According to OCHA, violence in Couyo, Arcahaie, displaced 2,884 people on 18 October 2026

    According to OCHA's 6 November 2026 report, violence in Couyo, Arcahaie, displaced 2,884 people on 18 October 2026.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-11)

  19. — According to OCHA, attacks in Petite-Rivière de l'Artibonite since 19 October 2026 displaced about 13,900 people

    According to OCHA's 6 November 2026 report, attacks in Petite-Rivière de l'Artibonite since 19 October 2026 forced about 13,900 people from their homes.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-11)

  20. — According to OCHA, two Norwegian Refugee Council staff killed in Port-au-Prince on 27 October 2026

    According to OCHA's 6 November 2026 report, two Norwegian Refugee Council staff members were killed in Port-au-Prince on 27 October 2026.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-11)

  21. — According to OCHA, nearly 1.5 million people displaced in Haiti as of 6 November 2026

    According to OCHA's Latin America and the Caribbean weekly situation report as of 6 November 2026, nearly 1.5 million people were displaced across Haiti, and almost 80 percent were outside Port-au-Prince.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-11)

  22. — According to OCHA, humanitarian partners reached 70% of Haiti's 2026 people-target as of 30 September 2026, with uneven departmental coverage

    According to OCHA, partners reached 70% of the national target of 4.2 million people as of 30 September 2026; coverage was uneven, with Nord-Ouest at 18% and Sud-Est at 31%; Nord-Est and Grand'Anse exceeded narrow initial targets without indicating complete coverage of needs; access constraints contributed to Artibonite's 54% response rate.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-11)

  23. — According to OCHA, Haiti 2026 HRP declared funding at $435 million of $880 million required as of 30 September 2026

    According to OCHA, declared funding for Haiti's 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan stood at $435 million, approximately 49% of the $880 million required, limiting capacity to maintain priority interventions amid deteriorating operating conditions.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-11)

  24. — OCHA reports humanitarian response in displacement sites

    According to OCHA, as of 27 October 2026, 47,800 gallons of water—45,000 for domestic use and 2,800 for drinking—reached 257 displaced people in Lotin (Fermathe); 38 children and pregnant women received vaccines against vaccine-preventable diseases; 390 children were screened for nutrition and 73 cases of acute malnutrition, including seven severe cases, were treated; and three of six displacement sites remained without a site-management partner.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-11)

Open questions

  • Is the international security support restoring control in Haiti, as the states behind it say?
  • How much of Port-au-Prince do gangs control? Estimates vary by source, date and definition, and some count influence as control.
  • When will the international force be fully operational? Up to 5,550 personnel are authorized, and about 400 had arrived by late April 2026.

Source registry

  1. BINUH / OHCHR — More than 1,600 killed in the first quarter of 2026; human_rights; 2026-05-08
  2. UN OCHA — Haiti 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan; humanitarian; 2025-12-18
  3. IOM — Haiti internal displacement (IOM / DTM); humanitarian; 2026-06-05
  4. IPC — Haiti Acute Food Insecurity, Sept 2025 – June 2026; humanitarian; 2025-10-10
  5. Human Rights Watch — Haiti — country reporting and investigations; human_rights; 2026-04-13
  6. ACLED — Haiti political-violence data; research; 2025-12-11
  7. UN Security Council — MSS to Gang Suppression Force (Resolution 2793); official_position; 2025-09-30
  8. World Food Programme — Haiti — World Food Programme; humanitarian; 2026-04-17

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