Totally Fine Foundation · Issue 007 · Two Maps / Two Ledgers

Central Sahel Crisis

Last reviewed · Totally Fine Foundation editorial desk · 11 min

Almost every number you have read about the Central Sahel belongs to a larger map — one that folds in Nigeria and Chad and calls it the same crisis. Underneath the aggregation, three countries carry 2.8 million people displaced inside their own borders, and two kinds of killing that no one should average together.

Metrics

The region that is counted twice.

The region that is counted twice

Start with the number, because the number is the trap. The Central Sahel — Burkina Faso, Mali and western Niger — held 2.8 million people displaced inside their own countries as of late April 2026, alongside 444,400 refugees. That figure is not the one most reports reach for. OCHA publishes two products for the same date: this three-country overview, and a Sahel-wide dashboard that folds in Nigeria and Chad and puts displacement at 5.8 million.

Inside the three-country frame, the weight is not spread evenly: of the 2.8 million displaced, 2.1 million are in Burkina Faso alone — roughly three-quarters — with 415,000 in Mali and 283,000 in western Niger, and the regional total quietly hides that concentration. The discipline this dossier keeps is to say which map each number belongs to. The Central Sahel is real; the Sahel that swallows it is a different measurement.

Sources: UN OCHA — Burkina Faso, Mali and Western Niger Humanitarian Overview; UNHCR — Sahel emergency — narrative and Operational Data Portal

Two ledgers of the dead, and why they cannot be added

The killing is counted by instruments that measure different things. OCHA logged 2,640 conflict deaths and 1,179 security incidents across the three countries in the first quarter of 2026 — a humanitarian aggregate that names no perpetrator. ACLED counts the same war a different way, and in its reading the deadliest single region of the Central Sahel in 2025 was Niger's Tillabéri, with more than 1,200 recorded fatalities, led by the Islamic State's Sahel Province, then the Nigerien military, then JNIM — state-force killing counted in the same ledger, without equating it to jihadist attack.

A US Department of Defense institution, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, keeps a third count and reports that the Sahel held 41 per cent of all militant-Islamist-linked deaths in Africa in 2025 — a share it has held for five straight years. These are separate units — humanitarian deaths, coded events, fatality shares — and the moment they are summed the count becomes fiction.

Sources: UN OCHA — Burkina Faso, Mali and Western Niger Humanitarian Overview; ACLED — Central Sahel political violence — Africa Overview; Africa Center for Strategic Studies (US Department of Defense) — Sahel militant-Islamist violence tracking

The abuses no one should average

The record of who kills civilians is documented on two axes, and the honesty is in keeping them attributed and unequal. Human Rights Watch, after interviewing more than 450 people, found that in Burkina Faso the military, its allied militias and JNIM together killed more than 1,800 civilians since 2023 — a floor it calls possibly the tip of the iceberg. The single largest incident in that record is a state-force one: the Burkinabè military and allied militias killed more than 400 civilians near Djibo in December 2023. The deadliest single jihadist massacre HRW verified is smaller — at least 133 civilians killed by JNIM at Barsalogho in August 2024.

In Mali the pattern is army-plus-Wagner: HRW documented dozens of summary executions and enforced disappearances of ethnic Fulani men since January 2025. Amnesty keeps a parallel ledger and names the same perpetrators separately — at least 58 unarmed civilians killed by the military and its VDP militia at Solenzo, around 60 of 100 detainees shot by the Malian army and Wagner near Kwala, and, in the other columns, roughly 34 civilians killed by the Islamic State in the Sahel and about 100 soldiers by GSIM at Djibo. Both organisations are advocacy monitors, not courts; their characterisations are theirs, attributed, and the juntas reject them.

Sources: Human Rights Watch — Sahel — abuses by all sides (Burkina Faso; Mali); Amnesty International — Human Rights in West and Central Africa

The war that moved into the capitals

The insurgency has climbed from the countryside into the cities, and the International Crisis Group reads it as one interlocking system rather than three local fights. In September 2025 JNIM cut the fuel supply to Bamako — a city of over four million — impeding commerce for months; by 2026 a siege of the capital's roads had followed, with three main routes into Bamako blocked since late April. In the first half of 2025 the group laid siege to as many as forty towns in Burkina Faso, and Crisis Group assesses that it now controls vast areas of Mali and runs a light administration that levies taxes and dispenses its own justice.

Niger's situation Crisis Group calls not so dire, yet in late January 2026 the Islamic State in the Sahel struck the country's main airport and military base. The Africa Center attributes 78 per cent of the region's militant-Islamist-linked fatalities in 2025 to the JNIM coalition — its own analytical coding of event data, not a legal finding.

Sources: International Crisis Group — Sahel program — the war that moved into the capitals; Africa Center for Strategic Studies (US Department of Defense) — Sahel militant-Islamist violence tracking

Sovereignty, and the account it does not settle

The three governments are coup-installed juntas that formed the Alliance of Sahel States, and their case is recorded here strictly as a position. They frame the coups and the pivot from France and ECOWAS toward Russia as restored sovereignty and a more effective security strategy, and in December 2025 they launched a 5,000-strong joint force headquartered in Niamey — first units operational, but far from full capacity. Burkina Faso's junta dismissed the report that its forces had killed some 1,800 civilians as conjecture.

The record the juntas contest keeps accumulating: in June 2026 all three states deposited notifications to withdraw from the International Criminal Court, effective a year later, which Amnesty frames as entrenching impunity. Wagner announced the end of its Mali deployment in June 2025, but analysts assess its personnel largely folded into the Russian-defence-ministry-run Africa Corps — the label changed, the partnership did not. Whether security has been restored is the central contested claim of this crisis, and the independent monitors do not support it.

Sources: International Crisis Group — Sahel program — the war that moved into the capitals; Human Rights Watch — Sahel — abuses by all sides (Burkina Faso; Mali); Amnesty International — Human Rights in West and Central Africa

Reported attacks on military garrisons

According to the GRANIT report, coordinated attacks by non-state armed groups on 25 April 2026 targeted military garrisons in Kidal, Gao, Mopti, Bamako and Kati, including a reported attempted blockade of Bamako.

The GRANIT report links the reported security events to new internal and cross-border displacement, according to the report.

The same report says strategic commercial corridors were reportedly interrupted and links the reported security events to worsening access to food. It also reports that Mauritania is under increasing pressure from reported tensions with Bamako and reported incursions near its border by Malian armed forces and Africa Corps, according to the report.

According to the GRANIT multirisk monitoring report for January–June 2026, which draws on IOM, REACH, and OCHA sources, northern Benin is identified as the period's area of greatest concern, with a security escalation the report describes as unprecedented since 2019. The report attributes 62 armed incidents, 52 deaths, and 17 injuries to the reporting period. It also reports that an attack on two military positions at Kourou Koualou displaced 2,461 people and describes this as the period's largest direct humanitarian impact. The report states that displaced populations arriving from Burkina Faso, Niger, and Nigeria are increasing pressure on already constrained essential services in Benin's Alibori and Atacora departments.

According to the same report, the Savanes region of Togo remains under strong security and humanitarian pressure. The report describes repeated incursions by non-state armed groups, the continuing state of emergency, and humanitarian-access constraints as disrupting livelihoods, commercial exchanges, and related activities. It projects deterioration to Crisis, or IPC Phase 3, in the Kpendjals.

Sources: UN OCHA — Burkina Faso, Mali and Western Niger Humanitarian Overview

Claims and evidence

The AES military governments are restoring security.

Claimant: AES military governments

Evidence status: disputed

Counterclaim: Independent monitors document fatalities rising after the coups and JNIM blockading the Malian capital.

Independent assessment: Disputed: ACLED and the Africa Center document the Sahel as the world's deadliest region for militant-Islamist violence, and JNIM's September 2025 fuel blockade brought Bamako to a standstill. A reported 2025 fall in Burkina fatalities is disputed against reports of mass civilian killing by state forces.

Sources: ACLED — Central Sahel political violence — Africa Overview; Africa Center for Strategic Studies (US Department of Defense) — Sahel militant-Islamist violence tracking; International Crisis Group — Sahel program — the war that moved into the capitals

The withdrawal of France (Barkhane) and the UN (MINUSMA) caused the crisis.

Claimant: Common single-cause framing

Evidence status: likely

Counterclaim: The insurgency predates the 2022–2023 withdrawals by a decade.

Independent assessment: Likely partial, false as a single cause: the crisis cycle opened with the 2012 Mali coup and JNIM formed in 2017; the drawdown plausibly removed counter-terror capacity and coincided with escalation, but is at most an accelerant, not the origin.

Sources: International Crisis Group — Sahel program — the war that moved into the capitals; Africa Center for Strategic Studies (US Department of Defense) — Sahel militant-Islamist violence tracking

Sahel displacement is mainly climate migration, not conflict.

Claimant: Common reframing

Evidence status: disputed

Counterclaim: OCHA and UNHCR identify armed conflict and protection failures at the core.

Independent assessment: Disputed: OCHA states the crisis is driven by armed conflict, mass displacement and collapsing services; UNHCR calls it a volatile mix of conflict, hunger and climate change with conflict and protection at the core and climate a compounding stressor.

Sources: UN OCHA — Burkina Faso, Mali and Western Niger Humanitarian Overview; UNHCR — Sahel emergency — narrative and Operational Data Portal

Russia's Wagner Group has withdrawn from Mali.

Claimant: Moscow and the juntas

Evidence status: disputed

Counterclaim: Analysts concur the personnel largely transferred to the defence-ministry-run Africa Corps.

Independent assessment: Disputed as true-but-misleading: 'Wagner is leaving' is literally true, but 'Russia is withdrawing' is misleading — continuity under a rebrand, with the same operations and, monitors say, the same abuses.

Sources: Human Rights Watch — Sahel — abuses by all sides (Burkina Faso; Mali)

Timeline

  1. — Mali coup — second military takeover in nine months

    Malian military officers conducted the country's second coup in nine months, deposing the transitional president. The instability paved the way for closer ties with Russia and eventual French military withdrawal.

    Sources: ACLED — Sahel Region — ACLED Data; International Crisis Group — Sahel Security Crisis — International Crisis Group

  2. — Alliance of Sahel States (AES) formed; withdrawal from ECOWAS

    Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger formally established the Alliance of Sahel States and announced withdrawal from ECOWAS, consolidating a bloc oriented toward Russia and away from Western security partnerships.

    Sources: International Crisis Group — Sahel Security Crisis — International Crisis Group; UNOCHA — Sahel Crisis Response — UNOCHA

  3. — Record civilian casualties in Q1 2026 — Burkina Faso worst affected

    ACLED Q1 2026 data showed Burkina Faso registered the highest number of political violence events in the Sahel, with jihadist attacks on villages and markets in the Sahel and Est regions accounting for the majority of an estimated 3,200 civilian deaths in the quarter.

    Sources: ACLED — Sahel Region — ACLED Data; UNOCHA — Sahel Crisis Response — UNOCHA

  4. — Health Cluster Mali funding at 36.9% by 31 July

    According to the Health Cluster Mali July 2026 bulletin, the Mali Humanitarian Response Plan remained substantially underfunded, with 36.9% of Health Cluster resources mobilized by 31 July 2026.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-08)

  5. — Health Cluster Mali bulletin reports volatile security and critical conditions

    According to the Health Cluster Mali July 2026 bulletin, security conditions remained volatile in northern and central Mali, with continued population movements; humanitarian conditions in some intervention areas were critical, exacerbated by armed violence, forced displacement, and climate-change effects.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-08)

  6. — Kidal security incidents disrupt health access in Gao, per Health Cluster Mali

    Per the Health Cluster Mali July 2026 bulletin, security incidents in the Kidal region limited population access to health facilities in Gao and disrupted continuity of essential services, contributing to deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Gao.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-08)

  7. — Displaced people recorded in Mali in July 2026, per Health Cluster Mali

    Mali's Directorate-General of Health and Public Hygiene recorded displaced people in July 2026, according to the Health Cluster Mali July 2026 bulletin.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-08)

  8. — GRANIT report describes coordinated attacks on Malian garrisons

    According to the GRANIT report, coordinated attacks by non-state armed groups on 25 April 2026 targeted military garrisons in Kidal, Gao, Mopti, Bamako and Kati, including a reported attempted blockade of Bamako.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-10)

  9. — Report links 25 April events to reported displacement

    The GRANIT report links the reported security events to new internal and cross-border displacement, according to the report.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-10)

  10. — Report describes reported corridor interruptions and worsening food access

    According to the GRANIT report, strategic commercial corridors were reportedly interrupted, and the report links the reported security events to worsening access to food.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-10)

  11. — GBVIMS report dated 26 Oct 2026 records Q3 2026 Mali gender-based violence figures

    According to the GBVIMS report published on 26 Oct 2026, 3,619 gender-based violence incidents were recorded in Q3 2026 (up 4.6% from Q2 and 65.7% from Q1), bringing documented incidents since January to 9,263; physical assaults accounted for 19%, psychological violence 16.4%, rape 15.6%, forced marriage 14.1%, and sexual assaults 8.2% of reported incidents; sexual violence totaled 862 incidents (23.8%) and rose 6.4% from Q2.

    Sources: ReliefWeb (OCHA) — ReliefWeb reports ingested by editorial pipeline (2026-10)

Open questions

  • Are the AES military governments restoring security, as they say?
  • Did the withdrawal of France and the UN cause the crisis, or speed up one already under way?
  • Has the Wagner Group left Mali, or continued under a new name?
  • Is displacement in the Sahel driven mainly by climate or by conflict?

Source registry

  1. UN OCHA — Burkina Faso, Mali and Western Niger Humanitarian Overview; humanitarian; 2026-04-29
  2. UNHCR — Sahel emergency — narrative and Operational Data Portal; humanitarian; 2026-06-29
  3. ACLED — Central Sahel political violence — Africa Overview; research; 2026-01-13
  4. Africa Center for Strategic Studies (US Department of Defense) — Sahel militant-Islamist violence tracking; research; 2026-04-06
  5. Human Rights Watch — Sahel — abuses by all sides (Burkina Faso; Mali); human_rights; 2026-04-02
  6. Amnesty International — Human Rights in West and Central Africa; human_rights; 2026-07-02
  7. International Crisis Group — Sahel program — the war that moved into the capitals; research; 2026-02-20
  8. World Food Programme — West Africa / Central Sahel emergency — assistance ledger; humanitarian; 2026-01-16

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